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We examine the impact of family control on the cost of raising external funds by family 
enterprises. Using a sample of Australian publicly listed firms, we find a significantly negative 
relation between cost of newly raised capital and family control. Moreover, we show that this 
relationship varies with the quality of corporate governance and the quality of firm’s information 
environment. Further, we conduct several robustness checks and consistently find that our main 
results remain unchanged. Overall, our evidence suggests that family firms have easier access to 
external financing fostered by family involvement in the ownership and control.  
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It has been well documented that family and non-family firms differ significantly in several 
important dimensions. For instance, family-controlled firms tend to perform better (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003), are more valuable (Villalonga and Amit, 2006), have lower dividend-payout ratios 
(Attig et al., 2016), and exhibit higher level of employee satisfaction (Huang et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, they react differently to rare events such as economic downturns (Lins et al., 2013) 
and political uncertainty (Amore and Minichili, 2018). Despite fairly extensive literature in this 
area, there is a scarcity of evidence on the availability and the cost of external financing for family 
versus non-family firms, especially in the context of the country-specific quality of investor 
protection and alternative ownership structures.  
This paper investigates whether family and non-family firms differ in the cost of access to 
equity and debt financing. We choose to study Australian firms as they represent a particularly 
useful setting for our research questions. First, family firms are well represented in the Australian 
capital market and its economy at large (Mroczkowski and Tanewski, 2007; Moores and Mula, 
2000; Graves and Shan, 2013). Second, the agency conflict in Australian firms tends to be less 
severe than in vast majority of other countries around the globe, as investor protection for 
shareholders and creditors in Australia is generally strong (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
Consistently, Gray et al. (2009) state that Australia has a unique and relatively strict institutional 
and regulatory framework. La Porta et al. (2002) argue that the Australian capital market is 
considered as high ownership concentration where 50% firms are family firms at 20% cut-off 
value. Family firms in Australia, the private benefits of control are higher in the line with the 
argument of Lamba and Stapledon (2001). The authors argue that if private benefits of control 
are high if a firm will have higher controlling shareholders. Nenova (2003) documents a high 
mean value (23%) of control-block votes in Australia in comparison with other developed 
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countries. Further, the ownership structure of Australian family firms is distinct from those in 
other common law countries. The equity ownership stake held by a typical family firm is 
significantly higher as compared to family ownership in e.g., U.S. or U.K. (Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009). Third, with regard to corporate governance, prior research such as Stapledon (1995) shows 
that about 45% of the firms are owned by non-institutional shareholders. Even institutional 
investments in family firms are lower than other two developed nations (Velury and Jenkins, 
2006). Later, Dignam and Galanis (2004) find that in Australian family firms are mostly owned 
by non-institutional corporate shareholder. There is a dominance of blockholders in Australia and 
they likely involve in private rent extraction. This indicates that Australian listed family firms do 
not follow the outsider corporate governance mechanism like other developed nations, U.K and 
U.S. Finally, in respect of market for corporate control, Brakman et al. (2006) argue that there is 
a weaker takeover market in Australia compared to that of the U.K and the U.S.   
Finally, family firms are more concerned about potential penalties and reputation harm and, 
therefore, are willing to sacrifice tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of potential price 
reductions. This is because family firms are sensitive to tax incentives (Chen et al., 2010). 
Australia provides an interesting framework for our analysis. Although Australia, U.K and U.S 
are considered as Anglo-Saxon countries, the Australian capital market is smaller compared to 
other continental countries (La Porta et al., 1998; 1999). The market capitalisation of Australian 
Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange and NYSE are around A$2 trillion, US$4.6 trillion and 
US$30 trillion in 2018.  
The Australian debt market is substantially different from other developed countries. 
Approximately, 90% of corporate debt in Australia is provided by commercial banks, versus 54% 
in Europe, and only 16% in the U.S (Ernst & Young, 2018)1, meaning that firms in Australia 





essentially do not issue debt in the corporate debt market to raise new capital. Australia has 
introduced imputation tax system in 1987 which leads to significant change to the tax framework.2 
This change has influenced the use of debt financing and eventually results in changes in 
corporate capital structures (Twite, 2001; Pattenden, 2006).3 
Using a large dataset spanning the period from 2000 to 2016 and covering 3,901 firm-year 
observations, we find a negative and statistically significant relation between family control and 
the cost of equity as well as the cost of debt. This result implies that firms in which founding 
families play a relatively greater role through equity ownership, have easier access to external 
financing and therefore pay less for raising debt or equity. The results remain qualitatively the 
same when we use alternative measures of our key variables. Next, we conduct additional tests to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance and the information environment on the cost of 
financing. We find that greater family control acts as an effective monitoring device and appears 
to substitute other standard monitoring mechanisms such as independent board of directors and 
concentrated institutional ownership. More specifically, the banks tend to charge lower interest 
rates and equity investors demand lower returns, if the family control is more intense, even in the 
absence of board or other shareholders’ oversight. Indirectly, this result is in line with e.g., 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) who document higher valuations of family firms, as well as Anderson 
et al., (2003) who find lower cost of debt financing for the U.S. sample. This result is also 
                                                             
 
2 A dividend imputation tax system gives shareholders a credit which can be used to offset individual income taxes 
on dividend. Under the Australian imputation tax system, firms pay dividends on profits that taxed in Australia 
(named as franked dividends), and corporate income tax could be imputed in contradiction of individual tax 
compulsions on dividend income, and, hence, this efficiently removes the double taxation of dividends that exist 
under a traditional tax system. When dividends paid from corporate income have been taxed at the corporate tax rate, 
shareholders will receive a cash dividend plus the tax credit, and this tax credit can be used to offset their own 
personal tax liabilities. Dividends gained outside Australia (unfranked dividends) will be treated following a 
traditional tax schedule (Cannavan et al., 2004; Balachandran et al., 2019).  
3 Twite (2001) investigates the changes in the Australian firms’ capital structure under the dividend imputation tax 
system, and finds that firms tend to reduce debt financing and increase external equity financing. Pattenden (2006) 
examines Australian firms’ capital structure decisions under traditional and imputation tax regimes, and finds that 
tax incentives can help explain capital structure choice. 
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consistent with theoretical arguments put forward in seminal papers by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976).  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we extend research on the 
importance of the cost of external financing in the context of family ownership. D’Aurizio et al., 
(2015) study Italian family firms during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and find that credit to 
family firms is limited than that to non-family firms. Boubakri et al., (2010) investigate the 
association between family control and cost of equity financing. They report that before the Asian 
crisis family control is not associated with firms' equity financing costs, however, following the 
crisis, family control is observed related to a higher cost of equity. Contemporaneously Boubakri 
and Ghouma (2010) examine the impact of corporate governance on bond yield-spreads and 
ratings. Using multinational sample firms, they observe that family control is positively related 
to effect bond yield-spreads, and negatively associated with bond ratings. Anderson et al. (2003) 
examine the link between founding‐family ownership and firm performance and provide evidence 
that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Ellul et al. (2007) examine whether family 
blockholders have any impact on the firm's debt agency costs. They use international bond issues 
from 1995 to 2000 for 1,072 international firms originating from 24 different countries and 
document that family firms originating from high investor protection environments benefit from 
lower debt costs compared to non-family firms. Recently Ma et al. (2017) explore the relationship 
between family control and firms’ cost of debt. Using Chinese data, they report that family control 
is associated with a lower cost of debt. However, as far as our knowledge goes no studies have 
examined the link between cost of debt and cost of equity capital in the context of unique setting 
Australia as discussed earlier. We aim to fill this gap in the literature. 
Our paper provides a new perspective by analysing the impact of family control on the cost 
of equity and debt for Australian listed companies using a long time series of data. We exploit 
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this research setting due to the fairly significant control of family firms in the Australian capital 
market that allows us to draw meaningful conclusions concerning the cost of raising outside funds 
for family versus non-family firms. Second, our study adds to the corporate finance literature on 
the cost of capital in general (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Chen et al., 2009; Hou et al., 2012; 
Byun et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2013). Third, our work complements the body of research on the 
importance and attributes of family-controlled firms. Extant literature reports ambiguous 
evidence on superior performance of family-run companies, their higher managerial efficiency, 
higher valuations, as well as different financing and investment policies as compared to widely-
held non-family firms. This paper sheds further light on the unique characteristics of family firms 
by providing additional empirical evidence on the economic importance of the family 
involvement on the cost of raising external capital.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and explains research methods. Section 
4 discusses the results, whereas Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis development  
A substantial literature examines the impact of information asymmetry between management 
and outside investors on firm financing decisions. The Pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that firms with higher information asymmetry have higher 
external financing costs and choose debt financing over equity to reduce costs, signal managerial 
expectations, and mitigate the level of information asymmetry. Similarly, existing research has 
highlighted an important role of firm information asymmetry in determining share financing 
choices (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Bortolotti et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2009; Autore et al., 2011). 
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In this paper, we posit the existence of the difference in the cost of equity and debt between 
family and non-family firms due to different types of agency problems associated with these 
firms. Extant literature suggests that family firms are not subject to traditional agency problems. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) identify the classic agency problem between owners and managers 
as “Agency Problem I” while the other type of agency conflict between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders as “Agency Problem II”. Traditional agency problem (Agency Problem I) 
arises when there is a conflict between managers and shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). They 
further argue that agency cost (Agency Problem I) in family firms may be lower compared to 
non-family firms because of the close relationship between owners and managers. In family firms, 
members of the family generally hold executive positions and are therefore involved in the 
decision-making process. Since ownership concentration in family firms is high, principals play 
more direct monitoring roles over firms’ activities which should lead to a greater alignment of 
interests (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Also, family firms seem to have better managerial skills, 
enjoy lower risk, superior knowledge in business activities and effective relationships with 
customers and suppliers. This is consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) who provide evidence 
that the performance of family firms is better than non-family firms. Hence, family firms are 
expected to be efficient in their business activities and this will result in reducing agency problems 
between managers and principals.  
In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) posit that 
concentrated ownership in family firms causes agency problems between the majority shareholder 
(the family) and the minority. The conflict of interest between controlling owners and the minority 
is likely to be higher due to majority of the ownership of a firm being held by a few family 
members (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Family firms may expropriate minority shareholders by 
extracting private benefits because they enjoy effective control in family firms (Anderson and 
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Reeb, 2003). The agency problems in the family firms are also examined with regard to 
accounting quality but the outcomes are inconclusive. For example, Wang (2006), Ali et al. (2007) 
and Tong (2008) find that family firms report better quality earnings than non-family firms. Their 
results are consistent with the arguments made by Stein (1989) who posits that financial reporting 
quality of family firms is superior to that of non-family firms due to the family members’ long-
term investment horizon. This in effect prevents them from becoming involved in value-
destroying rent seeking behaviour. Furthermore, Hutton (2007) conjectures that family firms may 
not be involved in manipulative activities because family members are considered to be long-
term investors. Consistently, Chrisman et al. (2004) and Ghosh and Tang (2015) argue that 
accounting quality for family firms is higher than non-family firms because these firms are 
directly monitored by family members. Similarly, Chen et al. (2008) assert that family firms 
deliver more earnings warnings due to their awareness about the litigation risks and reputation 
costs. In regard to tax avoidance, Chen et al. (2010) report that family firms avoid less tax than 
non-family firms. Their findings indicate that in comparison with non-family firms, family firms 
are more aware about the probable reputational damage and penalties associated with an internal 
revenue service audit. This may result in reducing managers’ opportunistic behaviour (Tong, 
2008).  
In contrast, Jabeen and Shah (2011) argue that corporate disclosures in family firms are likely 
to be of lower quality than in non-family firms. This is because family members hold substantial 
amounts of shares in family firms and have direct access to special information. Consistent with 
this notion, Chen et al. (2008) and Anderson et al. (2009) reveal that family firms report less 
voluntary disclosure compared to non-family firms. This is because family owners actively 
participate in managerial activities which lead to lower information asymmetry between owners 
and managers. More recently, Razzaque et al. (2016) show that family firms in emerging 
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economies engage in more real earnings management compared to non-family firms because the 
minority expropriations by the controlling shareholders in weaker investor protection 
environments is high compared to developed countries.  
With reference to firms’ performance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Sraer and Thesmar 
(2007) observe that family firms perform better than non-family firms. Similarly, Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) report that family ownership creates value if the founder is a CEO in family firms. 
In contrast, Li and Ryan (2015) find that family control destroys firm value.  
Not many studies have explored the impact of family ownership on cost of equity capital and 
cost of debt. Boubakri et al., (2010) document that compared to non-family firms in East Asian 
countries, family firms have higher cost of equity capital after the late 1990s Asian financial crisis. 
As argued earlier, Australia is distinctive because of its strict institutional and regulatory 
framework and the ownership structure of family firms where the equity ownership stake held by 
a typical family firm is significantly higher than other developed countries. Therefore, we expect 
that family firms have lower cost of equity capital. 
Limited studies have examined the link the between family ownership and cost of debt. For 
example, Anderson et al. (2003) find a negative relationship between founding family ownership 
and cost of debt. They argue that in family firms’ divergence of interests between shareholders 
and bondholders is less compared to their counterpart non-family firms, and that family firms 
maintain long-lasting personal relationship with external parties including bondholders, banks 
and other parties, which results from family reputation that may reduce cost of debt. Anderson et 
al. (2003), Ellul et al. (2007); Fahlenbrach (2009); Lin et al. (2011), Aslan and Kumar (2012), 
and Achleitner et al. (2014) conjecture that cost of debt in family firms is likely to be lower 
because their main motive is survival and hence, they invest relatively more in low-risk projects.  
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Gonzalez et al. (2013) investigate whether family ownership has impact on capital structure. 
Using Colombian firms, the authors document that debt levels tend to be lower for younger firms. 
Similarly, Keasey et al. (2015) report the association between leverage and willingness to dilute 
control. They report that young family businesses are less willing to dilute control. Recently, Ma 
et al. (2017) argue that whether the cost of debt in family firms is higher depends on country-level 
regulatory environment such as weak or strong investor protection. Consistently, we posit that, 
since Australia is classified as a strong investor protection country, there is less expropriation of 
minority shareholder by family firms. Moreover, family firms provide transparent information to 
the shareholders, creditors and bondholders that may result in lower cost of equity capital and 
cost debt. 
Therefore, we formulate our main hypothesis as follows: 
Main hypothesis: There is a negative relationship between family control and the cost of 
equity and cost of debt.  
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Data, sample, and descriptive statistics 
We collect data from the Bloomberg, DataStream, DatAnalysis and I/B/E/S databases. Our 
initial sample consists of the population of companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) and covered by the I/B/E/S database for the period 2000-2016. The sample begins with 
7,662 firm years’ observations. We eliminate 2,147 firm-year observations due to unavailability 
of family ownership data. Financial firm sector is dropped due to different specifications and 
operating nature of financial firms compared to non-financial firms. We also drop observations 
with missing values in the computation of cost of equity.  In addition, we exclude observations 
with incomplete information for control variables and due to this, we lose 789, 586, and 689 firm 
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years for price/earnings to growth ratio (PEG), modified PEG ratio (MPEG), and Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) models, respectively. This exercise leads us to a final sample size of 
3,412, 3,215, and 3,110 firm-year observations for the PEG (Easton, 2004), MPEG (Easton, 2004) 
and OJN model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), respectively. For cost of debt, after 
eliminating firms from financials sector and firms with incomplete information for family 
ownership and control variables, we arrive at the final sample of 3,412 firm-year observations. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample distribution for cost of equity models and cost of debt. 
Panel B and Panel C of Table 1 provide details of the distribution of firm-years across years 
and industries, respectively. The lowest number of family firms is (n = 142) in 2000, with 4.16 
percent of sample firms, and the largest number of firms is (n = 286) in 2013, representing 8.38 
percent of sample firms. The distribution is fairly even with no apparent evidence of clustering in 
any year. We classify firms according to the Global Industries Classification Standard (GICS) 
codes. A large proportion (24.50%) of firms is concentrated in the Industrial sector followed by 
Consumer Discretionary (21.71%), Materials (19.78%), Consumer staples (9.23%) and Energy 
(7.21%). These are the most widely represented industry sectors in the sample and, thus, the 
distribution indicates that the chosen firms operate in a broad array of industries. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample firms and the univariate test of 
differences between family and non-family firms. Results of the univariate analysis indicate that 
family firms are smaller in size (13.74 vs. 18.33). Family firms utilize less leverage (17.58 vs. 
27.32) and are less risky (0.78 vs. 1.19) than non-family firms. These firms are more likely to be 
audited by a Big 4 auditing firm (95% vs. 90%). Family firms also have a higher return on equity 
(5.56% vs. 4.75%) and lower capital to total assets ratio (5% vs. 7%) than non-family firms in 
our sample. Family firms are more financially sound (ZSCORE) than non-family firms (3.23 vs. 
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2.81). Founding families on average hold 31.93% of the firm’s outstanding equity.  
The univariate results of Panel B in Table 2 imply that family firms have lower average cost 
of equity (0.17 vs. 0.18)4 and cost of debt (0.06 vs. 0.08) than non-family firms. Finally, results 
in Panel C show that the family firms represent the 27% of our sample firms.     
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Table 3, we report the Pearson correlations between the explanatory and control variables 
in the model. Consistent with the above univariate analysis, family control (FAM) variable is 
significantly negatively correlated with SIZE, BETA, LEV and CAPTA variables. In contrast to 
this, there is a significant positive correlation of 0.14 between the Big 4 auditors (BIG4) and FAM. 
Overall, the underlying nature and magnitude of the reported correlations suggests that the 
independent variables can be jointly included to form a parsimonious regression model. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3.2 Main variables 
3.2.1 Identification of family-controlled firms 
We classify a firm as a family firm if the following criteria are satisfied: (i) the existence of a 
dominant shareholder who is identified as founding member or family members involved in the 
management of the company and has a direct interest of greater than 20 per cent of voting shares; 
(ii) the dominant shareholder is the CEO or a key member of the board; and (iii) the dominant 
shareholder continues to be the dominant shareholder and board member during the sample 
period. We also removed firms that are controlled by business groups including family and non-
family members. Based on this classification, we construct the dummy variable (FAM) which 
equals 1 if the firm is classified as a family firm and 0 otherwise. This ownership-based dummy 
                                                             
4 The average cost of equity of our study is consistent with prior Australian study of Hasan et al. (2015). Furthermore, 
Truong and Partington (2007) show that cost of equity estimates for the Australian firms are in the range of 10-17%. 
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variable is the primary indicator of family participation in our testing5. For robustness checks, we 
also use the family equity holdings as a fraction of outstanding shares. 
3.2.2 Measuring cost of equity (COE) 
Prior studies employ both the implied approach and the realized approach for measuring the 
cost of equity (Monkhouse, 1993; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Hail and 
Leuz, 2006; Gray et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011; Hasan et al., 2015). However, some authors, for 
instance, Pastor et al. (2008), suggest that the implied approach is superior compared to the 
realized approach. Also, estimates based on ex-post realized stock returns suffer from 
measurement errors (Fama and French, 1997). As a result, we employ the implied approach to 
estimate the cost of equity. Following Hasan et al. (2015), we use price/earnings to growth ratio 
(PEG), modified PEG ratio (MPEG), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) models, labelled 
as COE_PEG, COE_MPEG and COE_OJN, respectively. Extant literature provides conflicting 
evidence regarding the superiority of any particular model in estimating the cost of equity capital 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2006). Therefore, we use the average of all three of these measures (COE_Avg) 
due to the lack of consensus on precisely estimating the cost of equity capital. The use of an 
average measure reduces the overall error in the cost of equity estimate (Dhaliwal et al., 2006; 
Hail and Leuz, 2006). We also present results for individual cost of equity estimates to show how 
the association between family firm control and cost of equity estimates varies across the models. 
3.2.3 Measuring cost of debt (COD) 
Following Kim et al. (2011), we employ interest rate spread as a proxy for cost of debt (COD), 
which is the difference between interest rate on debt and average annual prime rate. This approach 
                                                             
5 Anderson et al. (2003) argue that some families are able to exert control with minimal fractional ownership, while 
others require a larger stake for the same level of control. Therefore, ownership-based dummy variable approach, as 




is appropriate for our study as Australia businesses are greatly reliant on private debt over public 
debt (Gray et al., 2009). 
3.2.4 Control variables 
We use a number of variables into the analysis to control for other potential determinants of 
a firm’s cost of equity capital and debt financing, as suggested by the literature. Size of the firm 
can have a significant influence on cost of equity capital and debt financing as larger firms enjoy 
economies of scale and greater stability. Furthermore, larger firms have a lower probability of 
default (Berger and Udell, 1995), are followed more by analysts, and are more liquid (Witmer 
and Zorn, 2007). Therefore, to control for firm size, the SIZE variable is defined as the natural 
logarithm of total assets at the balance sheet date. SIZE is expected to be negatively associated 
with cost of equity capital and debt financing. To control for riskiness of the firm, we measure 
leverage (LEV) as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The sign for the LEV variable is expected 
to be positively associated with the cost of capital. BETA measures the firm’s stock price volatility 
with respect to the overall market and is calculated for 36 months ending in the month of issue 
forecast (Fernando et al., 2010). The sign for the BETA variable is expected to be positively 
related to the cost of equity capital and debt financing, as larger risk is associated with higher cost 
of equity and debt. We also employ the BIG4 variable which is represented as a dummy variable 
taking value of 1 if the auditing process has been performed by one of the Big 4 auditing firms 
and 0 otherwise (Carey and Simnett, 2006; Azizkhani et al., 2013), to control for the effect of a 
firm’s information disclosure quality on cost of capital financing. Prior studies provide evidence 
that Big 4 auditors conduct higher quality audits (Eshleman and Guo, 2014), encourage higher 
quality disclosures in firms’ financial reports (Chang et al., 2009). Mansi et al. (2004) argue that 
the potential conflicts of interest among owners, managers, and other shareholders create an 
environment in which an outside auditor may contribute significant benefits to investors, and 
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suggest that firms employing Big N or industry-specialist auditors have lower costs of debt. Other 
studies find that auditor quality might contribute as a governance and certification mechanism 
which can aid in reducing information asymmetry and enhancing the information environment 
and transparency of issuing firms and, hence, is associated with lower cost of capital (Khurana 
and Raman, 2004) and debt financing (Karjalainen, 2011). ROE is the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items to total equity. This variable reveals how much profit a company generates 
with the money shareholders have invested. Therefore, the sign for the ROE is expected to be 
negatively associated with cost of equity and debt. We also include book-to-market ratio (BM) as 
a growth proxy. To control for financial distress, we include Altman’s Z score.6 CAPTA is the 
ratio of capital to total assets. Finally, we include year and industry dummies to control for 
possible time and industry effects. For ease of reading, we also present these variable definitions 
in the Appendix. 
3.3 Empirical specification 
In the primary specification, we estimate the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) model 
to test the relationship between family control and cost of equity capital, and various control 
measures. 
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (1) 
where, COEi,t is cost of equity capital of firm i in year t. FAMi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for family-controlled firms in year t, and 0 otherwise. CONTROLSi,t-1 is the set of control variables 
defined in Section 3.2.4. All control variables are included in the regressions with a one-year lag. 
We include industry-fixed, and year-fixed effects to control for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence. All models are estimated with robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity 
and are clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). 
                                                             
6 Altman’s Z score = 1.2 (working capital/total assets) +1.4 (retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3 (earnings before 
interest & tax/total assets) + 0.6 (market value of equity/total liabilities) + 0.999 (sales/total assets). 
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Similarly, we employ the following model to test the association between family ownership 
and cost of debt financing: 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (2) 
where, CODi,j,t is cost of debt capital of firm i in year t. A description of the remaining variables 
is provided as above. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Relationship between family control and the costs of external funding 
Table 4 summarises the pooled OLS estimates of the effect of family-controlled firms on the 
cost of equity capital and debt financing. In Model 1, the regression results suggest that the family 
control is significantly negatively associated with the average cost of equity capital (Coeff = -
0.380 and p <0.01) and this result is consistent with our main hypothesis. Using COE_PEG as a 
measure of the cost of equity capital (Model 2), we also find that the FAM variable is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The regression results of remaining two-model 
specifications (Models 3 and 4) show that the family firms experience a lower cost of equity 
capital. In terms of economic influence on the cost of equity and debt, a one standard deviation 
increase in the level of family control reduces the cost of equity of 7.68% and debt 6.88%, 
respectively. 
In terms of the control variables, the coefficient for BIG4 is negative and significant, while 
the LEV coefficient estimate is significantly positively associated with cost of equity capital in all 
the estimations. The coefficient on SIZE estimate is negative and significant as expected.  The 
CAPTA variable is positive and statistically significant across all specifications of the cost of 
equity estimates, which suggests that higher capital adequacy ratio is associated with higher cost 
of equity capital. The coefficient on BM variable is negative and statistically significant in all 
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three specifications of cost of equity, which confirms that low growth firms enjoy lower cost of 
capital. However, ROE, BETA and ZSCORE variables are insignificant, suggesting that these 
variables have no impact on the cost of equity capital in our sampled firms. 
Model 5 presents the result of relationship between family ownership and the cost of debt 
financing. The coefficient on family ownership (FAM) is negative (-0.318) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that family firms experience a lower cost of debt financing. 
This result is in line with the main hypothesis. 
With respect to the control variables, BIG4 and SIZE variables are significantly negatively 
associated with cost of debt financing, as expected. The coefficient on LEV variable is positive 
and statistically significant (Coeff = 0.648 and p <0.01), which confirms that higher debt usage 
is associated with a higher cost of debt. Similarly, the CAPTA variable is positively associated 
with higher cost of debt financing.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, we conduct robustness checks to assess whether our results in the previous 
section are reliable.  
4.2.1 Firm-fixed effects 
Although we control in the regressions for many firm-level characteristics that are potentially 
correlated with family control and costs of external financing, we are aware that the results can 
be driven by unobservable and time-invariant heterogeneity across firms. We address this concern 
by performing a panel regression that includes firm-fixed effects. Panel A of Table 5 presents the 
results of this analysis for the whole sample. As shown, family control is significantly and 
negatively associated with different proxies for cost of equity capital as well as the average cost 
of equity capital (Models 1 through 4), and also negatively correlated with cost of debt financing 
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even after controlling for firm-fixed effects. Specifically, the coefficient estimates of the 
COE_Avg and COD variables are -0.598 (t-stat=-5.91) and -0.341 (t-stat=-3.33) for the 
specifications for cost of equity and cost of debt financing, respectively. These results suggest 
that our results are not driven by time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.2 Lagged family control  
It is likely that the relation between family control and costs of external financing is driven 
by reverse causality or simultaneity problems, for example, potential reverse causality between 
costs of external financing and family firm characteristics. To mitigate this endogeneity bias, we 
use the lagged value of the family control variable in the regression. While the lagged variable 
cannot entirely solve the endogeneity problem, they are suitable to alleviate the concern of reverse 
causality. Panel B of Table 5 reports results for the models with the lagged value of the family 
control variable. The results confirm a negative relation between family control and costs of 
external financing. The FAM coefficient estimates are -0.342 (t-stat=-5.09) and -0.298 (t-stat=-
2.89) for the specifications relating to cost of equity and cost of debt financing, respectively.  
4.2.3 Two-step system GMM estimate 
Endogeneity is a serious concern in the ownership literature. We have attempted to address 
potential endogeneity problems by accounting for firm fixed effects and using lagged family 
control in the robustness tests. However, we are aware that the results can be driven by 
unobservable heterogeneity across firms that can drive both family control and the cost of capital. 
In addition, as ownership structure is relatively sticky, using lagged family control does not 
adequately address concern about reverse causality. Therefore, we employ an alternative method, 
the two-step system GMM estimate, to further check the robustness of our baseline results.7 Panel 
                                                             
7 We thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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C of Table 5 presents the results of the two-step system GMM estimate of regressing cost of 
capital measures on family control. 
As shown, the family control is significantly, negatively associated with the cost of capital 
measures even after the two-step system GMM estimate, supporting the prediction that family 
firms are associated with lower cost of capital. 
4.2.4 Governance mechanisms 
Mande et al. (2012) and Dutordoir et al. (2014) find that corporate governance quality is 
related to whether firms issue various forms of debt or equity. Extant research provides evidence 
that the corporate governance mechanisms impact cost of capital (Anderson et al., 2004; Chen et 
al., 2009). For example, Anderson et al. (2004) document that cost of debt is inversely related to 
board independence. Later, using 559 firm-year observations across the 17 emerging countries, 
Chen et al. (2009) report that cost of equity is significantly associated with the ownership 
concentration.8 As a result, we investigate whether the effects of family control on cost of equity 
capital and debt financing differ between stronger and weaker governed firms using (i) board 
independence; and (ii) institutional ownership as proxies for the strength of the governance 
mechanisms. If family-controlled firms mitigate the agency conflicts, we would expect the effects 
of family control on cost of capital to be more pronounced in firms with weaker governance. 
Board independence represents the percentage proportion of the total number of board 
members that are identified as independent directors. The institutional ownership is measured as 
the sum of the percentage shareholding of all institutional shareholders within the company’s top 
20 shareholders. Then, we rank firm-year observations into terciles based on the institutional 
ownership at the beginning of the fiscal year for each sample year with high (low) ownership 
referring to a stronger (weaker) monitoring environment. Similarly, we rank firm-year 
                                                             
8 Chen et al. (2009) use two proxies for ownership concentration: The ownership of the five largest shareholders and 
the Herfindal index of the five largest shareholders (the sum of the squares of five shareholders’ ownership).  
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observations into terciles based on the board independence with the top terciles comprising firms 
having stronger governance and those firms in the bottom terciles having weaker governance. We 
subsequently examine the baseline model in the subsamples with stronger and weaker governance 
firms9 and report the results in Panel A of Table 6 for board independence and in Panel B for 
institutional ownership. 
We find that the impacts of family control on cost of capital and debt are strongly negatively 
significant for the subsample of firms with less independent boards and lower institutional 
ownership while this relation is statistically insignificant for the subsample of firms with more 
independent boards and higher institutional ownership. Overall, the results indicate that family-
controlled firms provide strong incentives for founding families to monitor the firm and reduce 
the agency conflicts in the absence of effective governance mechanism.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.2.5 High-versus low-quality information environment 
A number of previous studies suggest that information quality reduces cost of equity capital 
by curtailing information asymmetry. For example, Easley and O’Hara (2004), Francis et al., 
(2005) and Hail and Leuz (2006) find strong negative associations between proxies for 
information quality and cost of capital. Furthermore, using S&P 500 firms, Ali et al. (2007) report 
that family firms reduce information asymmetry by providing more quarterly forecasts than non-
family firms. To investigate this issue, we use the number of analysts following the stock 
(ANALYST) as proxy for the information asymmetry level. We measure analysts following as the 
average number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts over a 12-month period for a 
particular firm. Following Guay et al. (2011) and Kim et al. (2016), for each fiscal year, we sort 
firm-year observations into terciles based on the values of analysts’ following with more (less) 
                                                             
9 In the analysis, we exclude the observations derived from the middle tercile. 
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following refers to low (high) information asymmetry. Since our results provide evidence that 
family control reduces the agency problems and thereby the cost of capital, then in this section 
we posit that this effect would be more pronounced for firms where such information asymmetry 
is higher. We then examine the baseline model in the subsamples with high and low information 
environments. In the analysis, we exclude observations from the middle tercile. As anticipated, 
our results in Table 7 show that the negative effects of family control on cost of equity capital and 
debt financing are more pronounced for the subsample of firms where such information 
asymmetry is higher. Specifically, we find that the FAM coefficient estimates are -0.326 (t-stat=-
4.32) and -0.356 (t-stat=-4.14) for the specifications for cost of equity under low information 
environment (Model 2) and for cost of debt financing controlling for low information 
environment (Model 4), respectively; whereas, this relation is statistically insignificant for the 
subsample of firms with higher information environment (Models 1 and 3). 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.2.6 Use of alternative proxy for family participation 
As additional robustness test, we replace the FAM dummy variable with FAMOWN, which 
represents the percentage of total company equity shareholding held by all family members. The 
empirical equations are given as:  
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (3) 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (4) 
where, COEi,t (CODi,t) is cost of equity (debt) capital of firm i in year t. FAMOWNi,t the 
percentage of total company equity shareholding held by all family members. CONTROLSi,t-1 a 
proxy for the set of firm-level control variables reported with a one-year lag, including firm size 
(SIZE), stock market valuation (BM), operating performance (ROE), leverage (LEV), systematic 




Table 8 presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between family ownership and 
costs of external funding, employing different measures of cost of equity capital financing 
(Models 1 through 4) and cost of debt capital financing (Model 5). Similar to the main results in 
the baseline model (also see Table 4), the FAMOWN variable is significantly negatively 
associated with all the proxies for cost of equity capital and debt financing. This result is in line 
with the main hypothesis and consistent with the argument made by Anderson et al. (2003) that 
family ownership provides strong incentives for families to monitor and reduce agency conflicts. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.2.7 Family CEO  
Extant literature provides conflicting evidence regarding the role played by a family member 
on the CEO’s position in a firm. For example, Morck et al. (1988) contend that family CEOs can 
enhance firms’ wealth because they bring unique, value-adding skills to the business that result 
in superior accounting performance and market valuations. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
observe that family involvement in management positions is significantly positively associated 
with firm performance. However, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) and Barth et al. (2005) report 
the opposite. Anderson et al. (2003) find that having a family member as CEO is associated with 
a significantly higher cost of debt financing in a firm. Accordingly, we investigate the impact of 
two potential CEO choices: Family member as CEO or Outsider CEO. For this, we create a 
dummy variable coded as ‘1’ for a family member as CEO and ‘0’ for an outsider hired as CEO. 
The empirical equations are given as:  
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (5) 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (6) 
Table 9 presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between family member as CEO 
and costs of external funding. Results in Table 9 show that having a family member as CEO is 
associated with lower costs of external financing. Thus, the results are consistent with the 
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argument by Villalonga and Amit (2004) who suggest that the conventional owner-manager 
agency problem in non-family firms is more acute than the family-minority conflict in family 
firms with a member as CEO. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
4.2.8 Family firms’ age  
Gonzalez et al. (2013) document that debt levels are lower for younger firms and tend to have 
higher debt levels as the firms age. In a similar vein, Keasey et al. (2015) find that the owner’s 
stake is positively related to leverage and the life cycle of the firm matters in the financing 
decision. Accordingly, in Table 10, we report the effect of firm age in family-controlled firms on 
costs of external funding for the subsample of young firms and mature firms.10 We rank firm-year 
observations into terciles based on the firm age with the top terciles comprising firms having 
mature firms and those firms in the bottom terciles having young firms. We find that the effect of 
firm age on costs of external funding is stronger for mature family-controlled firms, suggesting 
that the relation of family control and costs of external funding is stronger for mature firms. 
5. Conclusion 
Companies raise external funding to finance new investments, pay for mergers and 
acquisitions or support their working capital needs. The cost of capital matters because it 
determines the profitability of the capital spending decisions, which in turn may reflect positively 
on the enterprise value. Companies concerned about creating wealth for shareholders, should aim 
at reducing their cost of capital (ceteris paribus), since it leads to value maximization and makes 
shareholders better off.  
In this paper, we find that Australian family firms enjoy lower cost equity and debt financing 
vis-à-vis firms without any family involvement. The effect is persistent and survives a number of 
                                                             
10 We thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
24 
 
robustness checks, in which we employ different measures of our main variables. Moreover, we 
find that family control may play an important monitoring role. Firms that exhibit poorer 
corporate governance and information environments benefit significantly from family 
participation in firms’ ownership structure and control. The Australian economy provides an 
attractive laboratory for the testing of our hypotheses given the incidence of family firms in the 
stock market, their reliance on bank funding, and the level of investor protection.  
 Our study suggests that investors should view founding family ownership as an 
organizational device that better protects shareholders’ interests. The findings obtained in the 
paper may guide policymakers, market participants and regulators with regard to different policy 
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Appendix: Definitions of variables  
Variable Name Definition 
Cost of Capital and Debt measures 
COE_PEG Cost of capital based on the model developed by Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
COE_MPEG Based on the model developed by Claus and Thomas (2001) 
COE_OJN Based on the model developed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
COE_Avg Mean estimate of the COE_PEG, COE_MPEG, and COE_OJN estimates 
COD Interest rate spread which is the difference between interest rate on debt and 
average annual prime rate 
Control variables 
FAM A dummy variable equal to 1 for family-controlled firms, and 0 otherwise 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets 
BETA Systematic risk which is stock beta determined over 36 months ending in the 
month of issue forecast 
BIG4 An indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the principal auditor of the firm is a 
Big 4, and 0 otherwise 
ROE Ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total equity 
BM Book-to-market ratio 
ZSCORE Altman’s Z score 
CAPTA Ratio of capital to total assets 
Robustness tests-related variables 
ANALYST Average number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts over a 12-month 
period 
FAMCEO A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for a family member as a CEO and 0 
otherwise  
FAMOWN Percentage of total company equity shareholding held by all family members 
BIND Percentage proportion of the total number of board members who are identified 
as independent directors 
IO Sum of the percentage shareholding of all institutional shareholders within the 






Sample selection and distribution across years and industries 
Table reports sample selection and sample distribution across years and industries for various cost of capital models. 
We classify firms according to the Global Industries Classification Standard (GICS) codes.  
Panel A: Sample selection by cost of capital model 












      I/B/E/S Forecasted EPS 7,662 7,662 7,662 7,662 7,662 
   diminished by:      
- Lack of family 
ownership data  
2,147 2,147 2,147 2,147 2,147 
- Lack of COC measure 
data 
N/A N/A 552 521 N/A 
- Belongs to financial 
industry 
1,314 1,314 1,162 1,195 1,314 
- Lack of control       
variables 
789 789 586 689 789 
 
     
Final usable sample 3,412 3,412 3,215 3,110 3,412 

















Panel C: Breakdown by industry 
 Total % 
Consumer Discretionary 741 21.71 
Consumer Staples 315 9.23 
Energy 246 7.21 
Healthcare 232 6.80 
Industries 836 24.50 
Information Technology 237 6.95 
Materials 675 19.78 
Telecommunication 69 2.03 










Descriptive statistics  
This table provides the results of descriptive statistics and univariate analysis for family and non-family firms. The 
sample comprises 3,901 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2016. The descriptive statistics variables include: SIZE 
(natural logarithm of total assets), LEV (total debt/total assets), BETA (stock beta calculated over 36 months ending in 
the month of issue of forecast), BIG4 (An indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the principal auditor of the firm is a 
Big 4, and 0 otherwise), ROE (net income before extraordinary items to total equity), BM (book-to-market ratio), 
ZSCORE (Altman’s Z score), CAPTA (capital to total assets), FAMOWN (Percentage of total company equity 
shareholding held by all family members), COE_PEG is cost of equity, estimated by the PEG model of Easton (2004), 
COE_MPEG is cost of equity, estimated by the MPEG model of Easton (2004), COE_OJN is cost of equity based on 
the model developed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), COE_AVG (mean of the COE_PEG, COE_MPEG, and 
COE_OJN estimates), COD (Interest rate spread which is the difference between interest rate on debt and average 
annual prime rate), and a binary variable for family firms (FAM). The t-value represents the significance of differences 




Panel A: Firm-level variables 
  Family firms Non-family firm t-value 

































































Panel B: Cost of equity and debt  



































Panel C: Dependent variable 
 Family firms % Non-family firms % 









Correlation Matrix  
Table presents the Pearson correlation matrix of the key variables. Symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
COE_PEG 1              
COE_MPEG 0.29*** 1             
COE_OJN 0.27*** 0.16*** 1            
COE_AVG 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 1           
COD 0.26*** 0.24** 0.20** 0.35* 1          
FAM -0.11** -0.21** -0.10** -0.14** -0.15** 1         
BIG4 -0.19*** -0.12*** -0.18** -0.17** -0.19*** 0.14*** 1        
SIZE -0.12*** -0.14** -0.15** -0.16* -0.10*** -0.18*** 0.47*** 1       
BM -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.15** -0.18** -0.10** -0.42*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 1      
BETA 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.23** 0.16** -0.14** -0.17*** -0.16** -0.23*** -0.16*** 1     
LEV 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06** 0.03* -0.04* -0.15* 0.11 -0.14** -0.15 0.12** 1    
CAPTA 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.22* 0.22** 0.15** -0.16*** -0.14*** 0.17*** 0.16*** -0.24*** -0.10** 1   
ROE 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.26* 0.24** 0.23** 0.22*** 0.16 0.18*** 0.13*** -0.43* -0.16** 0.14*** 1  




Family-controlled firms and costs of external funding 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between family-controlled firms and costs of external 
funding, employing different measures of cost of equity capital financing (Models 1 through 4) and cost of debt capital 
financing (Model 5). The empirical equations are given as: 
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (1) 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (2) 
where, COEi,t (CODi,t) is cost of equity (debt) capital of firm i in year t. FAMi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
family-controlled firms in year t, and 0 otherwise. CONTROLSi,t-1 a proxy for the set of firm-level control variables 
reported with a one-year lag, including firm size (SIZE), stock market valuation (BM), operating performance (ROE), 
leverage (LEV), systematic risk (BETA), disclosure quality (BIG4), financial distress (ZSCORE), and level of capital 
(CAPTA). Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also 
included to control for year-industry fixed effects. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors, which account for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. The symbols *** and ** indicate significance 











FAM -0.380 -0.358 -0.329 -0.368 -0.318 
 (-6.66)*** (-5.43)*** (-4.19)*** (-4.65)*** (-3.04)*** 
SIZE -0.182 -0.194 -0.227 -0.220 -0.1842 
 (-3.69)*** (-4.25)*** (-5.58)*** (-5.13)*** (-4.27)*** 
LEV 0.524 0.476 0.746 0.742 0.6482 
 (3.09)*** (3.09)*** (3.52)*** (3.289)*** (3.20)*** 
BIG4 -0.558 -0.482 -0.354 -0.309 -0.620 
 (-3.03)*** (-2.90)*** (-2.37)** (-2.18)** (-3.42)*** 
ROE -0.233 -0.326 -0.287 -0.350 -0.475 
 (-1.35) (-0.51) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-2.21)** 
BM -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 
 (-2.97)*** (-3.00)*** (-3.53)*** (-3.35)*** (-2.18)** 
BETA 0.074 0.062 0.059 0.051 0.049 
 (1.23) (1.07) (0.70) (0.49) (0.86) 
ZSCORE 0.294 0.270 0.357 0.350 0.269 
 (0.68) (0.51) (1.22) (1.02) (1.12) 
CAPTA 0.050 0.058 0.074 0.076 0.072 
 (3.64)*** (3.77)*** (5.09)*** (5.23)*** (4.74)*** 
Constant 2.064 1.842 1.896 1.896 1.086 
  (8.07)*** (9.29)*** (7.09)*** (8.61)*** (5.92)*** 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI 
R-squared 0.352 0.341 0.310 0.318 0.220 
















This table reports the panel regression of costs of external funding on family control using a number of robustness 
tests, including firm-fixed effects (Panel A), lagged family control (Panel B), and two-step system GMM estimate 
(Panel C). The results for cost of equity capital financing are reported in Models 1 through 4, and in Model 5 for cost 
of debt capital financing. The regression equations are as follows: 
titititi CONTROLSFAMCOE ,1,,,  +++= −    (1) 
titititi CONTROLSFAMCOD ,1,,,  +++= −      (2) 
where, COEi,t (CODi,t) is cost of equity (debt) capital of firm i in year t. FAMi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
family-controlled firms in year t, and 0 otherwise. CONTROLSi,t-1 a proxy for the set of firm-level control variables 
reported with a one-year lag, including firm size (SIZE), stock market valuation (BM), operating performance (ROE), 
leverage (LEV), systematic risk (BETA), disclosure quality (BIG4), financial distress (ZSCORE), and level of capital 
(CAPTA). Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Firms and year dummies are also 
included to control for firm-year fixed effects. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors, which account for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. The symbol *** indicates significance at the 
1% level. 











FAM -0.598 -0.505 -0.416 -0.493 -0.341 
 (-5.91)*** (-5.07)*** (-3.85)*** (-4.55)*** (-3.33)*** 
Constant 2.325 2.442 2.437 2.480 2.442 
  (5.49)*** (7.19)*** (6.58)*** (6.15)*** (5.91)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects FY FY FY FY FY 
R-squared 0.291 0.292 0.294 0.295 0.281 
Obs. 3,412 3,412 3,215 3,110 3,412 












FAMt-1 -0.342 -0.334 -0.315 -0.329 -0.298 
 (-5.09)*** (-4.88)*** (-3.89)*** (-4.31)*** (-2.89)*** 
Constant 2.009 2.011 2.009 2.012 -1.056 
  (5.23)*** (5.15)*** (5.19)*** (5.37)*** (-6.85)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI 
R-squared 0.342 0.339 0.340 0.338 0.216 
Obs. 3,412 3,412 3,215 3,110 3,412 












FAM -0.224 -0.211 -0.194 -0.217 -0.318 
 (-3.92)*** (-3.20)*** (-2.47)** (-2.74)*** (-3.04)*** 
Constant 1.218 1.087 1.119 1.119 1.086 
  (4.76)*** (5.48)*** (4.18)*** (5.08)*** (5.92)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI 
R-squared -0.224 -0.211 -0.194 -0.217 -0.318 





The effects of governance on the relation of family control and costs of external funding 
This table presents the empirical analysis results regarding the effects of governance in family-controlled firms on 
costs of external funding for the subsample of firms with poor and better governance measures. We use the percentage 
proportion of the total number of board members who are identified as independent directors (BIND) and institutional 
ownership (IO) as proxies for governance mechanisms to control for agency costs. For each fiscal year in the sample 
period, we sort firms into terciles based on the value of each governance measure. We rank firm-year observations 
into terciles based on the institutional ownership at the beginning of the fiscal year for each sample year with high 
(low) ownership referring to a stronger (weaker) monitoring environment. Similarly, we rank firm-year observations 
into terciles based on the board independence with the top terciles comprising firms having stronger governance and 
those firms in the bottom terciles having weaker governance. The empirical equations (1) and (2) are given in the 
previous tables. The results for board independence are reported in Panel A, and for institutional ownership in Panel 
B. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also included to 
control for year-industry fixed effects. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors, which 
account for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. The symbol *** indicates significance at the 1%. 
Variables 
Panel A: Board Independence 










FAM -0.384 -0.250  -0.268 -0.200 
  (-4.44)*** (-1.49)  (-4.73)*** (-1.51) 
Constant 2.685 2.276  3.033 2.055 
 (7.60)*** (5.40)***  (6.10)*** (4.31)*** 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI  YI YI 
R-squared 0.392 0.358  0.183 0.166 
Obs. 1,136 1,136  1,136 1,136 
Variables 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership 










FAM -0.356 -0.216  -0.267 -0.108 
  (-4.20)*** (-1.39)  (-5.01)*** (-0.65) 
Constant 2.386 2.657  2.439 2.439 
 (9.26)*** (5.37)***  (6.39)*** (5.07)*** 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI  YI YI 
R-squared 0.375 0.348  0.188 0.167 














The effects of information environment on the relation of family control and costs of external 
funding 
This table presents the empirical analysis results regarding the effects of information environment in family-controlled 
firms on costs of external funding for the subsample of firms with high and low information asymmetry measures. We 
use financial analysts’ following as a proxy for information asymmetry (ANALYST). For each fiscal year in the sample 
period, we sort firms into terciles based on the value of information asymmetry measure. We measure analysts 
following as the average number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts over a 12-month period for a particular 
firm. Following Kim, Li, Lu and Yangxin (2016), for each fiscal year, we sort firm-year observations into terciles 
based on the values of analysts’ following with more (less) following refers to low (high) information asymmetry. 
The empirical equations (1) and (2) are given in the previous tables. The results for cost of equity capital financing 
are reported in Models 1 and 2, and for cost of debt capital financing in Models 3 and 4. Detailed definitions of the 
variables are provided in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also included to control for year-industry fixed 
effects. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors, which account for heteroscedasticity 














FAM -0.115 -0.326  -0.123 -0.356 
 (-1.61) (-4.32)***  (-1.28) (-4.14)*** 
SIZE -0.020 -0.032  -0.028 -0.033 
 (-3.73)*** (-5.93)***  (-4.45)*** (-6.33)*** 
LEV 0.204 0.417  0.227 0.415 
 (1.96)** (4.44)***  (2.19)** (4.34)*** 
BIG4 -0.293 -0.599  -0.295 -0.525 
 (-3.07)*** (-6.78)***  (-3.19)*** (-5.97)*** 
ROE -0.189 -0.293  -0.116 -0.264 
 (-1.81)* (-2.86)***  (-1.67)* (-2.53)** 
BM -0.004 -0.009  -0.004 -0.007 
 (-2.21)** (-4.04)***  (-2.88)*** (-3.76)*** 
BETA 0.037 0.065  0.034 0.075 
 (1.33) (1.78)*  (1.25) (2.04)** 
ZSCORE 0.124 0.274  0.123 0.288 
 (1.67)* (3.65)***  (1.64) (3.85)*** 
CAPTA 0.041 0.054  0.042 0.067 
 (2.87)*** (4.98)***  (2.31)** (5.88)*** 
Constant 2.393 2.237  3.246 2.993 
 (7.43)*** (6.89)***  (7.57)*** (7.02)*** 
Fixed effects YI YI  YI YI 
R-squared 0.333 0.376  0.193 0.236 




Family ownership and costs of external funding 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between family ownership and costs of external 
funding, employing different measures of cost of equity capital financing (Models 1 through 4) and cost of debt capital 
financing (Model 5). The empirical equations are given as:  
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (3) 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (4) 
where COEi,t (CODi,t) is cost of equity (debt) capital of firm i in year t. FAMOWNi,t the percentage of total company 
equity shareholding held by all family members. CONTROLSi,t-1 a proxy for the set of firm-level control variables 
reported with a one-year lag, including firm size (SIZE), stock market valuation (BM), operating performance (ROE), 
leverage (LEV), systematic risk (BETA), disclosure quality (BIG4), financial distress (ZSCORE), and level of capital 
(CAPTA). The results for cost of equity capital financing are reported in Models 1 through 4, and for cost of debt 
capital financing in Model 5. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Year and industry 
dummies are also included to control for year-industry fixed effects. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors, which account for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. The symbols ***, **, and * 
















FAMOWN -0.242 -0.220 -0.275 -0.296 -0.128 
 (-4.69)*** (-2.96)*** (-6.00)*** (-7.46)*** (-2.64)*** 
SIZE -0.168 -0.191 0.151 -0.163 -0.147 
 (-4.52)*** (-5.75)*** (4.72)*** (-5.97)*** (-2.95)*** 
LEV 0.512 0.515 0.504 0.509 0.499 
 (6.18)*** (6.57)*** (5.32)*** (5.81)*** (4.03)*** 
BIG4 -0.589 -0.585 -0.476 -0.591 -0.288 
 (-5.66)*** (-5.40)*** (-3.24)*** (-5.78)*** (-2.59)*** 
ROE -0.375 -0.374 -0.361 -0.274 -0.479 
 (-2.23)** (-2.78)*** (-2.49)** (-2.68)*** (-3.34)*** 
BM -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 
 (-3.78)*** (-3.75)*** (-4.45)*** (-3.30)*** (-2.50)** 
BETA 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.062 
 (1.39) (1.33) (1.50) (1.42) (1.33) 
ZSCORE 0.282 0.283 0.289 0.302 0.295 
 (1.85)* (1.92)* (1.96)** (2.03)** (2.14)** 
CAPTA 0.056 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.049 
 (3.39)*** (4.92)*** (3.21)*** (2.89)*** (3.73)*** 
Constant 6.967 7.083 6.536 5.827 6.053 
 (4.92)*** (5.21)*** (4.09)*** (5.12)*** (3.13)*** 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI 
R-squared 0.195 0.187 0.186 0.177 0.167 




Family member as CEO and costs of external funding 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between family member as CEO and costs of external 
funding. The empirical equations are given as:  
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (5) 
𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (6) 
where, COEi,t (CODi,t) is cost of equity (debt) capital of firm i in year t. FAMCEOi,t is a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 for a family member as a CEO and 0 otherwise. CONTROLSi,t-1 a proxy for the set of firm-level control variables 
reported with a one-year lag, including firm size (SIZE), stock market valuation (BM), operating performance (ROE), 
leverage (LEV), systematic risk (BETA), disclosure quality (BIG4), financial distress (ZSCORE), and level of capital 
(CAPTA). The results for cost of equity capital financing are reported in Model 1, and for cost of debt capital financing 
in Model 2. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also 
included to control for year-industry fixed effects. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors, which account for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. The symbols *** and ** indicate significance 






FAMCEO -0.134 -0.195 
 (-5.01)*** (-3.58)*** 
SIZE -0.176 -0.115 
 (-3.10)*** (-2.35)** 
LEV 0.499 0.702 
 (3.99)*** (5.72)*** 
BIG4 -0.587 -0.682 
 (-5.55)*** (-5.21)*** 
ROE -0.279 0.474 
 (-2.34)** (3.15)*** 
BM -0.060 -0.011 
 (-2.48)** (-2.53)** 
BETA 0.072 0.054 
 (1.41) (1.23) 
ZSCORE 0.245 0.245 
 (1.04) (1.04) 
CAPTA 0.049 0.080 
 (2.73)*** (4.90)*** 
Constant 7.213 7.786 
 (21.67)*** (29.01)*** 
Fixed effects YI YI 
R-squared 0.196 0.187 












Firm age, family control and costs of external funding  
This table presents the empirical analysis results regarding the effect of firm age in family-controlled firms on costs 
of external funding for the subsample of young firms (YAGE) and mature firms (MAGE). We rank firm-year 
observations into terciles based on the firm age with the top terciles comprising firms having mature firms and those 
firms in the bottom terciles having young firms. COE (COD) is cost of equity (debt) capital of firm i in year t. FAM is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for family-controlled firms in year t, and 0 otherwise. Detailed definitions of the variables 
are provided in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also included to control for year-industry fixed effects. 
The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors, which account for heteroscedasticity and 
















FAM -0.019 -0.024  -0.009 -0.012 
 (-2.90)*** (-4.15)***  (-1.82)* (-2.82)*** 
Constant 3.783 3.755  3.987 3.986 
 (9.38)*** (9.23)***  (56.68)*** (56.59)*** 
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI  YI YI 
R-squared 0.269 0.270  0.159 0.160 
Obs. 1,026 1,026  1,026 1,026 
